Prevention of U.S. Hostage Taking and Other Isolating
Events. This paper aims to create a shared understanding of the specific and even unique aspects of personnel recovery at the strategic level. An examination of Annex 1 to National Security Presidential Directive -12 will provide a policy understanding that incorporates personnel recovery into a holistic government approach. This paper will describe personnel recovery architecture and the two fundamental models used overseas.
Finally, this paper will conclude with a recommendation to develop a national strategy for personnel recovery.
WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO PERSONNEL RECOVERY
On Tuesday, March 22 of 2011, minutes before a state dinner with the Chilean President in Santiago, Chile, President Barack Obama received a brief on the F-15E fighter crash in Libya during Operation Odyssey Dawn. 1 National Security Adviser
Thomas Donilon stayed back at the hotel in Santiago and relayed the rescue's progress to President Obama throughout his dinner. 2 The next day President Obama praised the U.S. Marines for their rescue of one crewmember and the Libyan rebels for the recovery and return to U.S. forces of the other crewmember. 3 President Obama lauded the overall recovery as "a testament to our military that we had fully prepared for any contingency, including something like this, and they were able to recover these individuals rapidly." 4 With the advent of global communications and shorter decisionmaking cycles, situations involving isolated personnel and hostages have a profound impact on the American people, U.S. civil and military leaders, and consequently U.S.
strategic decision-making. For our leaders faced with a hostage taking or an isolating event, how we execute personnel recovery is of strategic importance. 
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Events, will provide a policy understanding that incorporates personnel recovery into a holistic government approach. In a whole of government approach, Annex 1 to NSPD-12 directs the synchronization and response of United States Government capabilities to an event in which U.S. personnel become isolated from friendly control. 5 For the purpose of this paper, a whole of government approach is defined as "an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government (USG) to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal." 6 This paper will describe personnel recovery architecture and the two fundamental models used overseas. Finally, this paper will conclude with a recommendation to develop a national strategy for personnel recovery. This paper is meant to inform its readers and spark thought on the U.S. whole of government approach to personnel recovery.
The Strategic Environment
The national interests of the United States revolve around the security of the capabilities of both anti-terrorism/force protection and personnel accounting. 16 Figure 1 depicts that functional overlap between Antiterrorism/Force Protection and Personnel
Accounting across the continuum of personnel accountability. The United States' main objective with personnel recovery is to return isolated personnel to friendly control as soon as possible while leaving no one behind.
Traditionally, personnel at highest risk of isolation were downed aircrew members, Special Operations Forces (SOF) operating within enemy territory, or diplomats operating in high-risk areas. In the current operational environment, the risk of isolation extends to other broad categories of personnel to include General Purpose Forces, USG civilians and contractors, and American citizens working or vacationing abroad. to National Security Presidential Directive -12. 30 The presidential directive states that:
The escalating prevalence of hostage-taking, coupled with the increased presence of Americans abroad, requires the USG place a greater emphasis on the prevention of U.S. hostage-taking, the safe conduct of federal business and duties abroad, and both an effective personnel recovery infrastructure and a coordinated response capability to resolve hostage-taking or isolating events.
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Annex 1 to NSPD-12 emphasizes the synchronization of USG capabilities in response to an event in which U.S. citizens become isolated from friendly control, but also emphasizes the education and training needed for prevention and preparation. The presidential directive directs a comprehensive policy concerning personnel recovery from increased education and training to reintegration of recovered isolated personnel.
Annex 1 augments the guidance found in NSPD-12, United States Citizens Taken
Hostage Abroad, and articulates U.S. personnel recovery policy as:
The United States Government remains committed to the safe and rapid recovery of private Americans and United States Government personnel taken hostage or isolated overseas and to bringing to justice and punishing individuals or groups responsible for illegally capturing or holding such persons against his or her will. 32 Annex 1 establishes a comprehensive policy concerning personnel recovery with enabling objectives and specific tasks, guiding every department and agency toward three strategic personnel recovery objectives: prevention of, preparation for, and response to isolating events. 33 Annex 1 was a watershed effort forcing all federal departments and agencies to examine and address their personnel recovery efforts while providing enabling objectives to meet the three strategic objectives of prevention, preparation, and response.
The strategic objective of prevention is to decrease the vulnerability of U.S.
personnel working or traveling abroad. All U.S. departments and agencies will "evaluate current personal security, force protection, and personnel recovery education training at overseas venues where U.S. personnel are at risk of being taken hostage or isolated." 34 The key is education and training to reduce an individual's susceptibility to an isolating event. Departments and agencies will "train members as necessary, implement individual and organizational protective security measures, and indoctrinate U.S.
personnel with a thorough understanding of the security and threat environments abroad to help reduce the risk of hostage taking and other isolating events." 35 Across the continuum (Figure 1 ), anti-terrorism/force protection, personnel accounting and personnel recovery concepts and training overlap to effectively decrease an individual's susceptibility to an isolating or hostage taking event.
Preparation is different from prevention in that it anticipates a future isolating event will happen. The strategic objective of preparation is to prepare at-risk USG personnel with a shared understanding of personnel recovery processes and procedures. 36 In Annex 1 to NSPD-12, all departments and agencies will "train and prepare its personnel with an appropriate level of knowledge and skill to help them understand the risk environment, survive captivity, minimize their exploitation, and enable recovery from a threat environment." 37 Along with education and training, preparation helps build the USG and host nation capability and infrastructure needed during a personnel recovery response.
The last strategic objective is response to an isolating event. The strategic objective of response is to energize the personnel recovery network and quickly recover isolated personnel and manage their reintegration into normal operations. The USG will "enhance and maximize organizational responsiveness by strengthening and further integrating existing personnel recovery mechanisms." 38 Additionally, the USG will improve post-incident response in support on American citizens taken hostage or isolated. The USG should provide "an appropriate reintegration process that deliberately reintroduces individuals back into society." 39 Reintegration is a systematic and controlled process for recovered personnel and helps them to fully reintegrate back into their military or civil organization, their family, and society. The goal of the reintegration is to "gather critical information from recovered personnel through a series of debriefings," and protect "the health and well-being of returned isolated personnel." 40 The reintegration process is offered and open to all American citizens that are rescued from captivity and aids in returning rescued personnel back to duty or work as expeditiously as possible, both physically and emotionally fit. Additionally, in most parts of the world, the United States will require host nation or partner nation support to conduct response options to an isolating event. A host nation allows or permits the United States, "either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders" while a partner nation partners with the United States to accomplish a mission or support activity. 45 Accordingly, Annex 1 to NSPD-12 stresses the importance of building host nation support and partner nation cooperation in personnel recovery education, training, and capability. 46 A coherent whole of government approach requires early engagement with high-level civil and military leaders, and participation of both host nation and partner nation to prevent or respond to an isolating event. As with any international engagement, the emphasis "should be on developing trust, providing incentives, emphasizing mutual benefits, and ensuring proper alignment of motives for all players." 47 Effective personnel recovery requires host nation and partner nation trust, support, and capability. influential persons, and/or private citizens" negotiating for the release of isolated personnel. 50 The civil option is similar to the diplomatic option "with the exception the primary negotiator has no official ties and may want to distance themselves" from the U.S. or host nation government. 51 plan, coordinate, and monitor PR [personnel recovery] missions, and to integrate PR activities with other operations and activities in the assigned operational area. The JPRC is also the JFC's primary coordination center for PR assistance to another nation or other appropriate civil entity, when such assistance is authorized by the President, SecDef, or by USapproved prior agreements. 57 
Additionally, each Combatant Command component establishes a Personnel Recovery
Coordination Cell (PRCC), and SOF establishes an Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center (UARCC). 58 As illustrated in Figure 3 , the Combatant Command delineates a robust command relationship for personnel recovery and "facilitates the synchronization and integration of recovery operations…tailored to the situation and evaluated against the mission, the environment, and the specific force structure." 59 The complexities of the Combatant Command structure are mitigated in many ways, however, educated and trained professionals working in a tailored and structured command environment help facilitate successful action.
Chief of Mission in Charge of Personnel Recovery. Before a situation in a host
nation develops requiring the intervention of U.S. combat or rescue forces, the Combatant Commander may not be in the lead for personnel recovery. As long as a nation's sovereignty remains intact, the host nation has the responsibility for personnel recovery operations within their own sovereign boundaries. 60 In fact, this is the default case for most personnel recovery efforts in a host country and the Chief of Mission will be the lead. The PRO serves as the advisor to the RSO, country team, and appropriate host nation parties on all aspects of personnel recovery to include the application of current U.S.
policy, U.S. doctrine, and helps to coordinate and integrate host nation and U.S. civil search and rescue capabilities into a multinational, multiagency recovery architecture. 66 This model has been extremely successful and provides a full-time, personnel recovery trained expert, who is responsive to U.S. and host nation development and response requirements.
Recommendation -A National Strategy for Personnel Recovery
Personnel recovery requires a collective and comprehensive national strategy. A national strategy for personnel recovery would articulate a clear vision statement that defines what the nation hopes to achieve through prevention of, preparation for, and response to isolating events. A national strategy for personnel recovery requires successful change across all the departments and agencies in the federal government, change "sticks only when it becomes the way we do things around here." 67 In John
Kotter's book Leading Change, a good vision serves three important purposes: clarify the "general direction for change," motivate "people to take action in the right direction,"
and "coordinate the actions of different people…in a remarkably fast and efficient way." 68 A national strategy for personnel recovery would provide a collective and comprehensive direction for a whole of government approach.
A national strategy would collectively align all departments and agencies, fostering cooperation while adapting concepts to equip our national security professionals for the complex challenges ahead. 69 The process of developing a national strategy would harmonize a whole of government approach and provide clarity in the direction to a whole of government approach. Clarity to think of personnel recovery in whole of government terms, and the direction needed in developing a collective strategy that incorporates personnel recovery into a holistic government approach.
Effective leadership will motivate people to take action in the right direction. It takes leadership to define "what the future should look like," align the people with the vision, and "inspires them to make it happen despite the obstacles." 70 A national strategy implies building consensus and capability among all departments and agencies, which can cause friction between the organizational culture, roles and responsibilities. Only leadership can "blast through" the friction, "motivate the actions needed to alter behavior", and "get change to stick." 71 To provide the institutional impetus for strategy and leadership of the process, DoS and DoD should co-lead the strategy development within an interagency working group. performance measures to achieve strategic objectives of prevention, preparation, and response. Ultimately, a national effort will clearly integrate, synchronize and properly focus the interagency to eliminate personnel recovery gaps and duplication of programs. Accordingly, a national strategy's success depends more upon a new way of thinking about personnel recovery than the establishment of new programs.
Conclusion
The emphasis on personnel recovery will continue to grow in our complex operational environment. One of the challenges of integrating civilian and military efforts into a whole of government approach is the differing cultures found in civilian interagency compared to those found in military forces. 74 One way to mitigate cultural differences is to combine education and training venues, but more important, to integrate and exercise together as an integrated, interagency team. In essence, the interagency personnel recovery team with host nation support should train and exercise as it operates in the real world. In other words, the team should train as it fights, as integrated, interagency team. Agency, and several local police, fire and rescue organizations, all integrated into a massive personnel recovery exercise. 78 Ambassador Charles Ray participated in the first week of the two-week exercise, playing the role of the ambassador to a factious country, and "I helped the military participants learn to better function in a highly charged foreign environment under chief of mission control…this exercise is not about war; it's about saving lives." 79 These types of events help forge civilian and military teams and achieve the unity of effort needed in a whole of government approach.
Concluding the scenario that was started in the introduction, the following lines show how a whole of government approach to the personnel recovery process works.
The Ambassador, working in coordination with his staff and the Combatant
Commander's staff, requests and receives assistance from the military and civilian intelligence community, the JPRC forwards general location data to the RSO. The RSO and legal attaché coordinate with the host nation law enforcement agency for their assistance in recovering the captives. Because of their local area knowledge, the host nation safely recovers the USAID representative and FSN driver. In this scenario, personnel recovery worked because of an integrated civilian and military whole of government approach with clear interagency coordination, effective host nation development and relations, and a responsive process that minimized friction between military, civilian and host nation participants.
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